Title: U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. First Edition in dustjacket.
Publisher:  Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977, ISBN:0521393272
Seller ID: 114131
FREEDMAN, Lawrence. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, (1977). First Printing. Pp. (6),[vii]-xv,(1),-235,(5). 8vo, black cloth with gilt lettering to spine, top edge stained black. "In recent years there has been a lively debate in the US over the quality of intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic forces, and on therole that these estimates play in the formulation of US strategic arms pol icy. This book discusses some of the main issues in this debate, examining in detail the performance of the US intelligence community as it attempted to monitor and predict the development of Soviet forces from the early daysof the cold war to the last days of the Ford Administration. Most of the m ajor intelligence debates of the period are covered, including the 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap' debates of the 1950s, and those over Soviet ABMs andMIRVs of the 1960s and 1970s. The book begins with an institutional histor y of the US intelligence community. This explains the process by which intelligence estimates have been produced and how the changing character of this process has affected both the content and the influence of the resulting estimates. A major point of the book is that in determining the nature of the Soviet 'threat' arguments concerning US vulnerabilities are as important, if not more so, than arguments concerning intelligence estimates of Soviet forces. To illustrate this point the question of the vulnerability of fixed-based ICBMs to an enemy first strike is taken as a case study. This question became a major strategic issue during the Nixon administration after having previously received little attention." - from the dustjacket. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The Intelligence Community: Speculative-Evaluative Intelligence -- The Central Intelligence Agency -- Military Intelligence -- Other Intelligence Agencies; 3. The Estimating Process: The Office of National Estimates -- National Intelligence Estimates, 1951-69 -- Estimates and Influence -- Estimates and Planning in the Department of Defense -- Henry Kissinger and the Decline of the Office of National Estimates -- The Fall ofthe Office of National Estimates -- The Estimating Process, 1973-6 -- The Structure of Power in the Intelligence Community; 4. The Missile Gap: The Soviet Threat, 1945-55 -- The Search for ICBMs -- Estimating Production Rates; 5. Greater-than-Expected Threats: The Shift to the Defence -- The Greater-Than-Expected Threat -- The 'ABM Gap'; 6. An Invulnerable Deterrent: The Threat to ICBMs -- Minuteman as a 'Hard Target' -- The Soviet Missile Force, 1961-9 -- The US Assessment of the Soviet Build-up; 7. The Sentinel Decision: The US Response to the Soviet Build-up -- Perceptions of the MinutemanVulnearability [sic] Problem -- The Sentinel Decision; 8. The Nixon Admini stration: Protecting Minuteman Through Safeguard: The Safeguard Decision --First-Strike Alarms -- Minuteman in Danger -- When is a MRV a MIRV? -- No Clear and Present Danger -- Safeguard: The Inadequate Shield -- Minuteman Vulnerability: A Threat Established; 9. Protecting Minuteman Through SALT: The Soviet Threat, 1969-71 -- Protecting Minuteman in the Long Term -- Protecting Minuteman Through SALT -- The 'Monster Missiles'; 10. Preparing for the Treat, 1972-6: A New Generation of Soviet Missiles -- MIRV and the Strategic Balance -- M-X; 11. US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. With bibliography and index.Very good in unclipped dustjacket. 35.00